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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human behaviour is regulated by a set of higher-order cognitive processes re-
ferred to as the executive functions of the brain and mind (Diamond, 2013; 
Miyake & Friedman, 2012). These general-purpose control mechanisms regu-
late human cognition and action, enabling the practice of self-control and self-
regulation with broad and significant implications for everyday lives. Executive 
functions are manifested in goal-directed behaviour, resulting from a complex 
interplay of processes involving planning, organized search, and impulse 
control (Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). The planning of actions in-
volves consideration of possible outcomes of alternative options and guiding the 
focus of attention. It also involves rejection of disadvantageous options and im-
pulse control to inhibit unwanted behaviours and experiences–resisting tempta-
tions, controlling for impulsive drives, and deliberately not attending to an 
object or event.  
One of the central roles in the planning and practice of executive functions 
belongs to decision-making. Psychologists define decision-making as the ability 
to make the most advantageous choice, having carefully considered a selection 
of possible behaviours (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000) and accounted for 
various risks and benefits relevant to the context (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, 
Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a).  
In scientific experiments, as in everyday life, a decision tends to be eva-
luated by its outcome: good or bad. To be able to accurately evaluate if “the 
most advantageous choice” was selected (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000), 
the decision-making situation needs to be structured and unambiguous. How-
ever, compared to experimental settings, real-life decision-making scenarios do 
not always offer a correct or incorrect “verifiable” option, but may be essen-
tially unstructured; the good and bad choice may also depend on the person 
making the decision as well as on various subjective circumstances of the situa-
tion. 
The scientific study of decision-making is still mainly focused on right or 
wrong answer, veridical decision-making paradigms, although more than 40 
years have passed since Tversky & Kahneman (1974) convincingly challenged 
the idea that human beings are merely rational actors. They showed this by 
demonstrating the role of heuristics and intuition in human decision-making. In 
clinical neuropsychology, the “gold standard” tests used for functional assess-
ment of the frontal lobes–the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, 
1948), Stroop Test etc–are all veridical in nature (Goldberg, Funk, & Podell, 
2012). The prevalence of veridical paradigms may be explained by the difficulty 
in producing valid and reliable non-veridical test batteries, or by the practical 
utility of correct vs. wrong answer tests, which are easy to implement and score. 
The limits of veridical neuropsychological tests are reflected in Mesulam's 
(1986) observation–coined as “Mesulam’s Mystery” by Burgess and colleagues 
(2009)–that some patients with frontal lobe damage show no cognitive impair-
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ment according to traditional office-based assessment procedures, but neverthe-
less show marked cognitive handicap in everyday life. Some would argue that 
the mismatch between neuropsychological assessment scores and the actual 
ability of the person to independently perform activities of daily living reflects a 
generally low ecological validity of executive function tests (Dawson & Mar-
cotte, 2017). Thus, developing novel executive functioning evaluation para-
digms to better predict the everyday behaviour of the subject outside the testing 
facility, represents an ongoing challenge for researchers and clinicians. 
As novel research methods and non-invasive neuromodulation techniques 
have become available, this thesis sets out to revisit the concept of non-veridical 
decision-making. The veridical vs. non-veridical model of decision-making was 
originally proposed in the 1990s (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994a) based on 
findings from lesion studies. This thesis aims to test the hypothesis that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as a region actively involved in cogni-
tive control is functionally specialised also for non-veridical decision-making. 
Going beyond neuropsychological lesion studies and behavioural observations, 
the present work applies non-invasive manipulation of DLPFC function in 
healthy subjects. By observing the effects of non-invasive modulation of neural 
activity in the prefrontal cortex, the thesis aims to revisit the functional role and 
contribution of the DLPFC to decision-making processes and highlight the 
potential difference between veridical and non-veridical cognition. As the 
DLPFC is known to participate in risky human behaviour (e.g., Bembich et al., 
2014; Boggio et al., 2010; Clark, Manes, Antoun, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; 
Fecteau et al., 2007; Guo, Zhang, Da, Sheng, & Zhang, 2018; Knoch et al., 
2006b; Luo, Ye, Zheng, Chen, & Huang, 2017; Minati, Campanhã, Critchley, & 
Boggio, 2012), the thesis also engages a non-veridical task involving risk. 
Finally, the work addresses the role of genetic predispositions in non-veridical 
cognition. This is carried out by evaluating potential effects of the BDNF 
Val66Met genotype–known to be expressed in neurobiological endophenotypes 
involved in executive functions–on non-veridical cognition.  
 
 
1.1. Executive functions and decision-making 
Executive functions are “those capacities that enable a person to engage suc-
cessfully in independent, purposive, self-serving behaviour” (Lezak, 1995) and 
can be thought of as a series of abilities needed to achieve a goal (Damasio, 
1995; Fuster, 2017; Stuss et al., 2005). Specific executive functions include task 
initiation, planning, purposive action, self-monitoring, self-regulation, volition, 
inhibition, cognitive flexibility, information updating and monitoring, and 
decision-making (Stuss 2011; Miyake & Friedman, 2000). Dividing executive 
function into smaller parts or sub-functions is a complex task and can be per-
formed from the perspective of structure, function, or dysfunction, without clear 
consensus among scientists (Hunter & Sparrow, 2012). Acknowledging the 
complexity of goal-directed behaviour, Stuss (2011) emphasises that executive 
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functions represent only one functional category within the frontal lobes: to 
fully understand the mechanisms of complex goal-directed behaviour, we need 
to look at connected non-frontal brain regions as well as various emotional and 
motivational processes that are integrated with executive functions. Several 
other researchers agree with this complex, multifaceted view of human goal-
directed cognition (Badre & Nee, 2018; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). 
Neurobiological mechanisms of human decision-making as the principal 
enabler of successful goal-directed behaviour, essentially depend on the func-
tion of the frontal lobes (Gazzaniga, 2004; Luria, 1966). The crucial role of 
decision-making processes in executive functioning is revealed in neuro-
degenerative disorders and brain injury: impairment of decision-making relates 
to loss of control over cognitive processes and goal-directed behaviour (Luria, 
1966; Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008). Treating the frontal lobes as a 
superstructure, Luria (1966) established that damage to the frontal lobes–parti-
cularly the prefrontal cortex–disrupts human goal-directed thought and regula-
tion of behavioural outcomes. Pribram (1973) noted that “the frontal cortex 
appears critically involved in implementing executive programs when these are 
necessary to maintain brain organization in the face of insufficient redundancy 
in input processing and in the outcomes of behaviour”, suggesting that the 
purpose of decision-making is to implement executive programs. These execu-
tive actions allow the person to pursue rewards and avoid/minimise loss or 
harm. As long as executive functions are intact, a person with significant cogni-
tive impairment in other mental faculties can still be able to lead an indepen-
dent, productive life (Lezak, Howieson, Loring, & Fischer, 2004). Impairment 
of executive functions, however, has a global effect on control and regulation of 
behaviour, whereby the person becomes unable to function well in everyday 
life, even if specific cognitive abilities have been preserved (Damasio, 1994; 
Miyake et al., 2000). Therefore, expanding our understanding of brain mecha-
nisms subserving executive functions bears significant value for the society. 
The organizational structure of the frontal lobes and their functional circuitry 
still remains largely unknown. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, researchers are 
increasingly challenged by academia and clinicians, as well as the society and 
industry, to explain how goal-directed behaviour in humans works–or doesn’t 
work. The incentives for understanding goal-directed behaviour have several 
obvious explanations: (1) apt decision-making is a prerequisite for adapting to 
environments and solving practical tasks; (2) resilience to mentally stressful 
conditions largely depends on effective decision-making mechanisms; (3) re-
vealing the individual patterns of goal-setting and decision-making is key to 
measuring personality and predicting individual behaviour; (4) successful thera-
peutic and rehabilitation practices considerably depend on relevant knowledge 
of decision-making mechanisms and ways in which to manipulate them; (5) as 
malfunction of cognitive control mechanisms is one of the main reasons behind 
risky behaviour and criminal conduct, sufficient knowledge about cognitive 
control and decision-making mechanisms can improve crime prevention, cri-
minal investigation and rehabilitation practices; (6) advancements in techno-
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logies related to artificial intelligence and autonomous robots can substantially 
benefit from knowing the mechanisms of executive processing in the brain. 
Some would argue that executive functions are domain- and process-general, 
influencing lower-level cognitive processes actively across a wide variety of 
tasks to guide goal-directed behaviour (Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 
2013). Others would argue that executive functions are diverse, separable, and 
poorly intercorrelated (Miyake et al., 2000). Friedman and Miyake (2017) sug-
gest that executive functions follow a pattern of “unity and diversity”, showing 
a general pattern of shared but distinct functions. Attempting to establish a 
general functional model, executive functions of the PFC have been divided into 
cognitive (“cold”) and affective/reward-related (“hot”) processes (Hongwanish-
kul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005; Nejati, Salehinejad, & Nitsche, 2018; 
Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007): the former relate considerably to the DLPFC and 
the latter to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). 
One avenue to exploring the mechanisms of goal-directed behaviour is to 
focus directly on complex decision-making, instead of probing individual 
executive functions or cognitive processes. Decision-making can be considered 
a part of executive functions that allows the human to exercise cognitive control 
over behaviour while pursuing a goal (Fellows, 2013). 
The act of making a decision can be broken down into three temporally and 
partially functionally distinct sets of processes (Ernst & Paulus, 2005): 1) 
evaluating possible options and forming preferences; 2) selecting and executing 
actions; 3) experiencing or evaluating the outcomes. Emphasizing that goals are 
steered by the value system, Fellows (2013) defines decision-making as pro-
cesses involved in making non-arbitrary choices based on their perceived value. 
While the value-based approach to decision-making incorporates several aspects 
of traditional executive functions (i.e. planning and reasoning), it also accounts 
for motivational and emotional aspects relevant for understanding decision-
making processes. Accordingly, part of the decision relates to extrinsically (ob-
jectively) correct solutions (a decision can lead either to correct solution or in-
correct solution), while another part relates to the agent-centered, non-veridical 
solutions for which there are no objective criteria of correctness. A more 
detailed account of the typology of decisions will be drawn in Section 1.2. 
 
 
1.2. Types of decisions 
To define the cognitive and neural mechanisms that guide individual choice, 
one needs to consider the type and content of the decision to be made and 
extract the “decision variables” involved (Smith & Huettel, 2010). Depending 
on the nature of the decision and the corresponding decision variables, a “task 
force” of cortical and interconnected regions is mobilized, determined as fit by 
the cognitive control center handling the task. 
In order to specify the neural substrates of various types of decisions, 
multiple classification systems have been proposed. By classifying decisions 
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according to their shared and non-shared characteristics, scholars attempt to 
create a model of the human decision-making system which would accurately 
predict decision outcomes from a given set of variables. The variables and 
characteristics of a decision that can determine the cortical response include 
contextual uncertainty, level of risk, emotional load, and reward immediacy 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Verdejo-Garcia, Pérez-García, & 
Bechara, 2006b). 
 
 
1.2.1. Decisions involving uncertainty 
When the full extent of potential outcomes and probabilities is unknown or will 
emerge only retrospectively, the decision is made under conditions involving 
uncertainty. Furthermore, decisions made under uncertain conditions can be 
divided into “decisions involving risk” and “decisions involving ambiguity” 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005). This division may not lead to 
mutually exclusive concepts as the factors determining the probabilities of gains 
and losses may not be known with absolute precision and the resulting decision-
making challenge may involve a mix of risk and ambiguity. 
 
Decisions involving risk 
Risk is a widely recognized variable according to which decisions are classified: 
a decision is risky if the outcomes are uncertain, if there is a low probability of 
gain or a high probability of loss, or if the outcome of the decision or reward 
comes with a long delay. A decision made in a situation where the probability 
of a desired outcome is knowingly low, is considered a “risky decision”. 
Although the probability of the desired outcome is low, the possible alterna-
tives, consequences, and probabilities relevant for the decision are known (Volz 
& Gigerenzer, 2012). The riskiness embedded in risky decision-making is trig-
gered by the need of the participant to decide between a safe choice and a risky 
choice, while knowing that the reward for the (low probability) risky choice is 
relatively more valuable (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005). Risky 
decision-making behaviour closely resembles what is described in the prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), which states 
that while choosing between probabilistic alternative choices that involve risk, 
people base decisions on the potential value of gains and losses rather than on 
the value of the final outcome. Furthermore, people tend to underweight out-
comes that are merely probable compared to outcomes that are perceived as 
certain. A commonly used task for risky decision-making is the Iowa Gambling 
Task (the IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), a card game 
involving probabilistic learning by monetary rewards and punishments. Other 
experimental tasks purporting to model risk-involving behaviour include the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) and the ball-throwing game 
of skill (Otsa, Paaver, Harro, & Bachmann, 2016). 
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Decisions involving ambiguity 
Ambiguity of choices occurs in situations where there are conflicting options or 
where the likelihood of error is high (Rosenbloom, Schmahmann, & Price, 
2012). In ambiguous conditions–unlike in risky decision-making–the alternative 
outcomes, consequences, and probabilities related to the potential outcomes of 
the decision are not known. As the probabilities of outcomes are unknown and 
unknowable, the probabilities of outcomes cannot be expressed with mathe-
matical precision in frequencies nor in propensities (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  
Despite the rational explanation of differences and commonalities between 
risky and ambiguous decision-making offered by Bechara and colleagues 
(2005), a factor analysis comparing various decision-making tasks reveals that 
three commonly used decision-making tasks–the IGT, the Balloon Analogue 
Task, and the Columbia Card Task (CCT)–all measure unique, non-overlapping 
decision-making processes (Buelow & Blaine, 2015). Thus, the risky-to-ambi-
guous continuum model of decision-making and various widely used experi-
mental tasks do not fully cover the range of decision-making processes and 
circuitry within the brain. In their review of ambiguous and risky decision-
making neuroanatomy, Brand and colleagues (2006) conclude that the evidence 
is inconclusive, as “the IGT measures different types of decisions: decisions 
under ambiguity in the first parts of the task and decisions under risk or cer-
tainty when those rules have been figured out”. Therefore, during the decision-
making process, there must be a point at which the subject realizes the rules of 
the game, recognising the explicit terms for wins and losses; the ambiguous 
decision becomes a risky decision. Nevertheless, both for risky and ambiguous 
decisions, the rules and win/lose terms have been externally defined and the 
goal of the subject is to uncover the externally defined conditions of successful 
decision-making. 
 
 
1.2.2. Decisions classified by veridicality of outcome:  
veridical vs. non-veridical 
As the risky vs. ambiguous classification of decisions failed to explain the full 
variety of decision-making behaviours demonstrated by healthy subjects and 
impairments observed in patients, a more sophisticated model for human 
decision-making was required. An alternative approach to modeling human 
decision-making processes was proposed by Goldberg and colleagues (1994a): 
decisions can be categorized according to the veridicality of outcomes. Al-
though involving uncertainty, for both risky and ambiguous decisions, it is still 
possible to establish whether the decision outcome is correct or incorrect ac-
cording to unambiguous, externally verifiable, objective criteria. Thus, the 
nature of both, risky and ambiguous decisions, is “veridical”. However, there 
are also decisions with outcomes for which there are no unambiguous, exter-
nally qualified criteria to objectively assess their correctness. Free choice or 
personal preference based, deliberately chosen options are all “correct” from the 
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In support of the veridical vs. non-veridical dichotomy, real-life cognition and 
behaviour appear to be dominated by non-veridical choice situations, seeking a 
“what is best for me” answer (Podell, Funk, & Goldberg, 2012), ranging from 
trivial (e.g., which shirt to wear or which main course to have for dinner) to life-
shaping (e.g., which career to pursue or which journal to publish in) choices. At 
the same time, research on PFC executive functions has so far been heavily do-
minated by methods employing veridical decision-making tasks, whereas PFC 
involvement in non-veridical decision-making has been rarely studied.  
The non-veridical paradigm may appear to be closely related to ambiguous 
decision-making. However, unlike an ambiguous decision, a non-veridical de-
cision does not represent a transition from an implicit to explicit state (Brand, 
Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006) during which the subject discovers the implicit 
rules of the game. Specifically, the agent-centered principle is explicit from the 
beginning of the task: the correct solution depends on the preferences of the 
subject and is not defined by external rules specifying wins or losses for scoring 
purposes. Non-veridical decisions utilize divergent thinking to “disambiguate” 
the unstructured situation and select the best choice for the decision-maker, 
based on internal goals, past experiences, and expectations for the future (Gold-
berg & Podell, 2000; Verdejo-García, Vilar-López, Pérez-García, Podell, & 
Goldberg, 2006a). 
 
 
1.2.3. Explicit vs. implicit decisions 
The risky vs. ambiguous and the veridical vs. non-veridical dichotomies share 
several characteristics and both contribute to explaining specific decisions. 
Moreover, risky decision-making situations, where a subject deliberately choo-
ses a suitable level of riskiness without external guidance, is not purely non-
veridical in nature, but–depending on the task–may also involve veridical com-
ponents, such as value calculations and utility calculations. In case of ambi-
guous decisions, initially appearing to be non-veridical, the subject is expected 
to figure out externally defined, “hidden” rules, in order to successfully solve 
the task. For example, to successfully solve the IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Da-
masio, & Anderson, 1994), the subject is expected to figure out which two out 
of the four card decks are advantageous, by trial and error. Unlike in a risky 
task, in ambiguous situations, the rules are initially implicit, not being revealed 
to the subject. 
More generally, the explicit vs. implicit dimension of decisions can be 
applied to both the veridical vs. non-veridical as well as the risky vs. ambiguous 
models of decision-making. In non-veridical decisions, the rules are explicit 
from the start: “Choose the one you like the best!”. Thus, the agent-centered ap-
proach whereby the decision depends on the preferences and subjective choice 
of the person making the decision, is explicitly revealed from the very be-
ginning. Completing ambiguous decision-making tasks, however, is known to 
involve multiple stages: the initial ambiguity surrounding the implicit rules for 
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gains and losses is being resolved during the process of decision-making 
(Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006). Specifically, in case of the ambiguous 
IGT concept, the ambiguity is dissolved at the point where the subject figures 
out the implicit rules for gains and losses. Thus, the IGT is veridical: the goal of 
the player is to uncover hidden, implicit rules; success is defined by the ability 
to make the hidden rules explicit. In non-veridical decisions, on the other hand, 
the lack of an externally defined, hidden correct or incorrect solution is explicit 
from the start, potentially establishing a different cognitive and neurobiological 
challenge for the subject compared to ambiguous decision processes concerned 
with making implicit rules explicit. Therefore, the cognitive and neural demands 
of veridical vs. non-veridical and explicit vs. implicit decision-making types 
appear to differ: the explicit rules embedded in the latter–although initially 
implicit–are still externally-defined and verifiable independently of the actor, 
not depending on the subjective preferences of the person making the decision. 
 
 
1.3. Neural mechanisms of decision-making and  
TMS effects  
The neurobiology of decision-making relies on a distributed network of cortical 
regions including the OFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), DLPFC, thalamus, 
parietal cortices, and caudate (Ernst & Paulus, 2005).  
Research findings on healthy subjects as well as on patients suggests that the 
key to explaining goal-directed behaviour including cognitive control lies 
within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Badre & Nee, 2018; Carlén, 2017; Fuster, 
2015, 2017; Miller & Cohen, 2001). The main PFC areas involved in cognitive 
control are DLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the orbitofrontal/ventro-
medial region of the PFC (Carlén, 2017; Fuster, 2015). The majority of 
decision-making structures–within, but also beyond the PFC–are lateralized. 
Accordingly, the contribution of the right and left DLPFC–a region famous for 
being a “usual suspect” in various cognitive tasks involving delayed response, 
online information processing, value calculations–is differentiated, suggesting 
advanced functional specialization within the DLPFC (Fuster, 2015, 2017; for 
illustration see Figure 2). However, the extent of functional specialization with-
in the prefrontal regions also largely remains a mystery. The PFC has reciprocal 
connections with a wide range of cortical and subcortical structures, es-
tablishing its role as a high-level orchestrator of a wide range of cognitive and 
affective neural functions (Selemon & Goldman-Rakic, 1988; Szczepanski & 
Knight, 2014). 
 
Figure 2. 
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For a theoretical as well as practical standpoint related to neuropsychological 
and clinical applications of TMS, it is important to acknowledge that cortically 
localised TMS produces a temporary, so-called virtual lesion (Pascual-Leone, 
Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000), with behavioural and cognitive effects similar to the 
real effects of lesions in patients. However, locally targeted TMS not only 
changes functionality of neural circuits directly beneath the TMS coil, but can 
also trigger cognitive and behavioural effects in the larger functional system, 
evoking activity in distant interconnected neural regions (Ilmoniemi et al., 
1997). For example, single pulse TMS targeted at the left DLPFC has been 
shown to elevate the BOLD signal in the anatomically interconnected ACC, the 
caudate, and thalamus (Dowdle, Brown, George, & Hanlon, 2018). Likewise, 
Strafella and colleagues (2001) have shown that high-frequency repetitive TMS 
(rTMS) of the DLPFC triggers the release of dopamine in ipsilateral caudate 
nucleus.  
Results of TMS research with neurotypical subjects can therefore serve as 
useful input to clinicians working with neuromodulation techniques in actual 
clinical settings to help develop the corresponding clinical practices. On the 
other hand, comparing data from experimental studies with healthy subjects to 
clinical data from patients, can point to limitations of TMS applications and 
methodology. Accordingly, promising future directions for advancing TMS 
based treatment methods and diagnostic tools may be discovered. For example, 
Pachalska and colleagues (2011) applied TMS to a frontal syndrome patient 
after severe traumatic brain injury and long-term coma in order to activate 
hypofunctioning areas in the frontal lobe. The rTMS intervention produced 
clinically significant improvements in executive dysfunction and behaviour, as 
well as physiological changes in EEG event-related potentials. 
TMS can be applied in single pulses (single pulse TMS) or repeatedly 
(rTMS). RTMS can be used to induce sustained changes in cortical excitability 
outlasting the stimulation period. The specific neural effect of rTMS depends on 
the frequency and intensity of stimulation as well as on the cortical state of the 
subject at the time of the procedure (Kähkönen, Komssi, Wilenius, & Ilmo-
niemi, 2005; Silvanto & Pascual‐Leone 2008). Low-frequency continuous 
stimulation results in depression of excitability at the target region, while high-
frequency stimulation increases excitability of the region (Pascual-Leone, Valls-
Solé, Wassermann, & Hallett, 1994). For example, 600 pulses delivered by 
continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS), a widely used rTMS protocol, has 
been shown to reduce the excitability of the cortical target site for more than 20 
min (Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005). 
TMS studies illustrate the lateralization of DLPFC functions, proposing 
differential roles of the right and left DLPFC in decision-making. Disruption of 
the right DLPFC is reported to result in increased risk taking, willingness to 
accept unfair offers (van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005) and higher 
acceptance of immediate personal rewards despite preserved awareness of value 
(Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a). Srovnalova and collea-
gues (2012) have demonstrated that high-frequency stimulation of the right 
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DLPFC triggers significant improvements on the Tower of London task 
(Culbertson, Moberg, Duda, Stern, & Weintraub, 2004) in patients with mild to 
moderate Parkinson’s disease, suggesting the causal role of the right DLPFC in 
strategic planning tasks. Thus, the role of the right DLPFC in decision-making 
is to exercise executive control over selfish impulses, while aligning behaviour 
with social norms and rules (Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). Prior studies with 
TMS have confirmed the contribution of DLPFC to risky decision-making 
processes related to value judgements (e.g., Camus et al., 2009), fairness-related 
decisions (e.g., van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005; Knoch, Pascual-
Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a), and deceptive behaviour (Karton & 
Bachmann, 2011; Karton, Palu, Jõks, & Bachmann, 2014). 
As right DLPFC disruption impaired decision-making, but not the perception 
of underlying value and fairness (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & 
Fehr, 2006a; Ruff, Ugazio, & Fehr, 2013), the right DLPFC appears to be 
relatively more responsible for action and execution of a decision, whereas the 
left DLPFC is committed to accumulation of evidence (Heekeren, Marrett, Ruff, 
Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2006), value calculations, and manipulating verbal 
and spatial information in working memory (Barbey, Koenigs, & Grafman, 
2013). MRI studies on value-based selection processes in the brain have also 
suggested that the fronto-parietal network is involved, whereby the DLPFC 
integrates values signals computed in the ventromedial PFC, and then activates 
the parietal cortex to read out the choice outcome (Domenech, Redouté, 
Koechlin, & Dreher, 2017).  
 
 
1.4. Aims of the thesis 
The general aim of the dissertation was to explore if non-veridical decision-
making can be modulated by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), in order 
to evaluate the theoretical basis of the non-veridical vs. veridical dichotomy. 
Throughout the studies featured in the current thesis, neural activity within the 
DLPFC is modulated by TMS in order to evaluate potential effects on perfor-
mance across various cognitive tasks, including non-veridical tasks representing 
agent-centered cognition where correct solutions are not predetermined. 
The DLPFC was chosen as the target of TMS stimulation due to its well es-
tablished, although not fully known and explained role in decision-making pro-
cesses. The specific aim of Study I was to selectively modulate non-veridical 
cognition without affecting veridical performance, by selecting multiple experi-
mental tasks and combining various stimulation frequencies (low vs. high-
frequency stimulation) and target sites (left vs. right DLPFC). The expectation 
of Study I was to identify target regions that specifically relate to non-veridical 
decision-making by manipulating activity in the underlying cortical areas. As 
Study I did not fully resolve the contributions of left and right DLPFC to non-
veridical decision-making, Study II set out to test the effects of modulation on a 
risky non-veridical task. The aim of Study II was to identify the effects of TMS 
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inhibition of the right DLPFC on non-veridical decisions involving risk. 
Following up on Study I and Study II, Study III aimed to explore the role of 
genetic variability in determining non-veridical cognition and individual suscep-
tibility to TMS influence. Specifically, Study III investigated the association of 
brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) Val66Met genotype to non-veridical 
task performance. The more detailed rationale for these studies will be pre-
sented in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation. 
The research questions addressed within the thesis are: 
1. Can performance on non-veridical vs. veridical decision-making tasks be 
selectively modulated by applying rTMS stimulation to the right or left 
DLPFC? 
2. How does rTMS stimulation of the right or left DLPFC affect performance 
on the non-veridical CBT task compared to baseline performance? 
3. Does the right DLPFC play a role in risky non-veridical behaviour? 
4. How does rTMS modulation targeted at the right DLPFC affect performance 
and preferences on the risky non-veridical task Game of Skill? 
5. Does the BDNF Val66Met genotype affect non-veridical baseline perfor-
mance and rTMS-induced changes on the CBT task? 
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2. SELECTIVE MODULATION OF NON-VERIDICAL VS. 
VERIDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
2.1. Non-veridical vs. veridical decisions 
Based on clinical observations in patients with frontal lobe lesions, an alter-
native model for decision-making was proposed by Goldberg and colleagues 
(1994a), suggesting a veridical vs. non-veridical division of cognition, including 
decision-making. 
Veridical tasks are about finding an objectively correct answer, which is 
inherent in the task, and exists independently of the person handling the 
problem (Goldberg, Funk, & Podell, 2012). The correct response is intrinsic to 
the external situation and is actor-independent (Goldberg & Podell, 1999). 
Veridical questions can be about objectively measurable properties such as size 
(“Which is bigger–A or B?”), color (“Pick the red ball!”) or time (“What year 
was it 5 years ago?”) and the correctness of answer does not depend on the 
preferences or will of the person delivering the answer. A is bigger than B even 
if the person being asked does not like it that way. 
Non-veridical decision-making, on the contrary, is an adaptive skill: the 
response is actor-centered, guided by the actor's priorities (Goldberg, Funk, & 
Podell, 2012). In non-veridical tasks, multiple alternatives exist in solution to a 
problem and several choices can appear as potentially advantageous, leaving 
room for the individual priorities and preferences of the agent (Goldberg, 
Podell, & Lovell, 1994a; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).  
Successful veridical decisions lead to an “unequivocally correct, albeit not 
always obvious answer” (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994a), whereas failure is 
associated with picking a wrong answer or making a mistake. In non-veridical 
decision-making, however, there can be good or bad choices, but instead of 
being defined by the external situation, they depend on the preferences and 
priorities of the person making the decision. Making a non-veridical choice–
such as which shirt or painting is “the best”–is an adaptive process that depends 
on the strategic self-regulation of behaviour by ranking and scaling the orga-
nism’s priorities in relation to the characteristics of the given situation 
(Goldberg & Podell, 1999; Levine, Dawson, Boutet, Schwartz, & Stuss, 2000). 
In the healthy brain, decision-making involves both, veridical and non-
veridical processes, depending on the nature of the task; impairments selectively 
affecting veridical or non-veridical cognition are revealed in subjects with 
specific lesions, executive dysfunction, or cognitive impairments. Supporting 
the veridical vs. non-veridical distinction, Verdejo-Garcia and colleagues 
(2006a) observed abnormal non-veridical decision-making performance in sub-
stance abusers, who displayed normal performance on veridical tasks (the IGT). 
In regard to how executive functions differ from cognitive functions (Lezak, 
Howieson, Loring, & Fischer, 2004), non-veridical decisions can be considered 
as executive rather than cognitive, addressing “How or whether a person goes 
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about doing something?” or “What is best for me?” (Goldberg, Funk, & Podell, 
2012) instead of focusing on “What or how much?”. By studying the preferen-
ces and priorities of the agent, non-veridical decision-making recognizes moti-
vational and emotional factors involved in a decision. Thus, non-veridical 
decision-making attempts to explain not just “what” or “how”, but “why” a 
certain behaviour was performed (Lezak, Howieson, Loring, & Fischer, 2004), 
contributing to the goal of value-based decision-making proponents to pay 
attention to motivational and emotional factors in flexible behaviour (Fellows & 
Farah, 2007). Importantly, a considerable share of a patient’s maladaptation and 
executive dysfunction may be due to non-veridical decision-making impair-
ment, despite displaying an adequate level of veridical decision-making. There-
fore, expanding knowledge about the mechanisms and expressions of non-
veridical decision-making as well as the effects of corresponding neurostimu-
lation treatments represents both, scientific and practical significance. 
 
 
2.2. Study I: Effects of repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on non-veridical decision-making 
The aim of Study I was to explore if modulating prefrontal activity by applying 
TMS to the DLPFC would differentially influence veridical vs. non-veridical 
decision-making. The goal was to confirm previous evidence suggesting a 
veridical vs. non-veridical neurobiological divide witnessed in studies on 
lesions, addiction behaviour in substance abusers (Verdejo‐Garcia et al., 2006a), 
and relevant neurostimulation research involving TMS (e.g., van't Wout, Kahn, 
Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005; Hadland, Rushworth, Passingham, Jahanshahi, & 
Rothwell, 2001) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (e.g., Ye et 
al., 2016; Nejati, Salehinejad, & Nitsche, 2018). As previous studies were 
performed mainly in the framework of risky decision-making, loss aversion, or 
specific executive functions, to the author’s knowledge there are no specifically 
veridical vs. non-veridical neurostimulation studies available. 
Previous findings have established that the right and left DLPFC both contri-
bute to decision-making performance (e.g., Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, 
Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a), whereas low and high frequency TMS protocols result 
in different effects on the underlying cortex (e.g., Romero, Anschel, Sparing, 
Gangitano, & Pascual-Leone, 2002; Kozyrev, Eysel, & Jancke, 2014) as well as 
different changes in behaviour (e.g., Pascual-Leone, Valls-Solé, Wassermann, 
& Hallett, 1994). Therefore, Study I explored stimulation effects by combining 
multiple rTMS target sites (left vs. right DLPFC) and stimulation conditions 
(low- vs. high-frequency). Several studies have also suggested that instead of 
causing lesion-like behavioural impairment effects, certain TMS protocols may 
trigger facilitation of cognitive performance (e.g., Cappa, Sandrini, Rossini, 
Sosta, & Miniussi, 2002). Neuromodulation of a target area may also result in 
compensatory activity changes in the contralateral cortical area, which forms 
the basis of using TMS stimulation in stroke rehabilitation whereby excitability 
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of the intact cortical region is reduced by low-frequency TMS in order to purpo-
sefully induce the participation of the damaged ipsilateral region (e.g., 
Johansen-Berg et al., 2002). Therefore, Study I included low-frequency (1-Hz) 
and high-frequency (intermittent 10-Hz) stimulation of both, left and right 
DLPFC, using both real TMS as well as Sham-stimulation. 
The results of Study I partially supported the hypothesis that veridical and 
non-veridical decision-making would respond differently to DLPFC stimula-
tion. All stimulation protocols triggered changes in non-veridical performance, 
whereas only low-frequency (1-Hz) stimulation of the right DLPFC also 
modified veridical behaviour. 
The experiment revealed differences between hemispheres: non-veridical 
and veridical decisions both rely on the right DLPFC, whereas the left DLPFC 
is more specifically committed to non-veridical cognition. The attempt to 
replicate lesion study evidence resulted in findings contradicting the prediction: 
following TMS stimulation, the decision bias shifted notably towards context 
independent, less stimulus‐driven choices. The observed shift in choice strategy 
is considered characteristic of posterior lesions rather than frontal lesions 
(Goldberg, Harner, Lovell, Podell, & Riggio, 1994b). Thus, findings of the 
present thesis emphasise non-focal, distal effects of focally applied TMS treat-
ment, especially when applied to particularly richly interconnected cortical 
regions, such as DLPFC. As the CBT, the non-veridical task used in the current 
study, is not specifically a risky decision-making task, a follow-up study using a 
risky task concept would allow to further explain the role and hemispheric 
lateralization of decision-making within the DLPFC. 
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3. NON-VERIDICAL DECISIONS INVOLVING RISK 
Knoch and colleagues (2006a) have demonstrated that suppression of the right, 
not left PFC using rTMS leads to overly risky decision-making while reducing 
consideration for the negative consequences of risky actions. Although risky 
decision-making is not exclusively associated with either veridical or non-
veridical cognition, it may–depending on the task–involve both non-veridical, 
preference-based strategic considerations and also veridical components, such 
as value and utility calculations. As the results of Study I indicated that non-
veridical and veridical decisions both rely more on the right DLPFC, whereas 
the left DLPFC may be more specifically committed to non-veridical cognition, 
we hypothesized that the role of the right DLPFC may be more prominently 
expressed in non-veridical decisions involving an added layer of risk. Re-
viewing the neurobiological basis of risky vs. ambiguous cognitive tasks, Brand 
and colleagues (2006) proposed that risky, but not ambiguous decisions, are 
accompanied by an active involvement of the fronto-striatal loop. In case of 
tasks in which the rules become explicit during repeated decision-making pro-
cesses, whereby an initially ambiguous task becomes a risky task (See section 
1.2.3), the fronto-striatal loop activates at the moment when the ambiguity 
becomes dissolved (Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006). As in non-
veridical decisions the agent-centeredness of the task–instructing the person to 
“Choose the one you like the best!” (see Section 1.2.2.)–is made explicit from 
the start, we can expect the activation of the right DLPFC and the fronto-striatal 
loop to be uniform throughout the course of the task. 
 
 
3.1. Neural mechanisms of risky decision-making 
Risky decision-making has been shown to be related to executive mechanisms 
of the DLPFC and related circuits (Bembich et al., 2014; Boggio et al., 2010; 
Clark, Manes, Antoun, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Fecteau et al., 2007; Guo, 
Zhang, Da, Sheng, & Zhang, 2018; Knoch et al., 2006b; Luo, Ye, Zheng, Chen, 
& Huang, 2017; Minati, Campanhã, Critchley, & Boggio, 2012). However, 
risky decision-making has been associated also with activity in the OFC, the 
rostral areas of the ACC, and the parietal cortex (e.g., superior parietal cortex) 
(Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, Castellanos, & Milham, 2006; 
Vorobyev, Kwon, Moe, Parkkola, & Hämäläinen, 2015). Studies have shown 
that value calculations and uncertainty processing as components of risky 
decision-making, are performed in distinct structures of the brain. Coding of 
reward magnitude, probability, and expected value engages the striatum and 
dorsolateral part of the frontal cortex, while reward uncertainty processing relies 
on recruitment of the OFC (Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007). 
Engagement of neural substrates also depends on the stage of decision-making: 
forming preferences activates a different neural pattern than executing actions 
(Ernst & Paulus, 2005). Furthermore, magnetoencephalography studies have 
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shown that expected value calculation and predicted reward variability encoding 
processes recruit different regions of the brain and occur at different time 
points. Representations of mean reward are delivered by parietal and visual 
areas, followed up by activation of frontal regions including the OFC. Encoding 
of reward variability, on the other hand, occurs with a delay, after the mean 
reward coding has already engaged the OFC (Bach, Symmonds, Barnes, & 
Dolan, 2017).  
Compared to risky decision-making, an ambiguous decision context does not 
provide sufficient information about the probabilities of outcomes and the value 
of alternative choices. The definition provided by Fellows (2013)–“decision-
making is the processes involved in making a non-arbitrary choice based on 
value”–appears compatible with ambiguous decisions, as the person can assign 
value to secondary variables inherent in the context or decide based on personal 
preferences. 
Zelazo and Müller (2002) propose that the neural substrates of risky and am-
biguous decision-making–as well as of other executive functions–can be 
divided into “hot” and “cool” subtypes. The relatively hot affective aspects of 
executive functions are associated with ventral and medial regions of the PFC 
including the ACC, whereas the cool aspect is associated with the DLPFC. The 
cool executive functions are relatively likely to be triggered by abstract, de-
contextualised problems, while the hot respond to problems requiring regulation 
of affect and motivation, including social understanding, and regulation of 
limbic system functions (Zelazo, Qu, Müller, & Schneider, 2005). 
Theoretically, non-veridical decisions may relate to both, the hot and cool 
subtypes of executive functions, depending on the structure and gameplay of the 
specific task. However, as the current thesis is focused on goal-directed beha-
viour and the neural mechanisms subserving application of own preferences and 
free choice to solving cognitive tasks without an immediate affective compo-
nent, the studies are more concerned with the cool subtype and the DLPFC. 
 
 
3.2. Study II: Diminished risk aversion after right DLPFC 
stimulation: effects of rTMS on a risky ball throwing task 
Study I demonstrated the role of the DLPFC in non-veridical decision-making 
by revealing a general effect of TMS stimulation on CBT task performance, 
triggering a shift in free choice preferences of the individual towards more 
internal representations driven, context independent selection style. However, to 
further explore the role of the DLPFC in non-veridical decision, the involve-
ment of a risk factor appeared feasible. Numerous previous studies have 
specifically emphasized the role of DLPFC in active value-related tasks in 
win/loss situations, during which adaptive strategy execution is practiced by the 
subject (e.g., Camus et al., 2009; Manes et al., 2002). As prior research had also 
established the relevance of the PFC for planning and executing motor 
behaviour (e.g., Fuster, 2001; Goldman-Rakic, Bates, & Chafee, 1992), Study II 
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aimed to involve a risky decision-making task with a motor response. By 
selecting a motor response task, we attempted to achieve a more realistic and 
dynamic risk scenario for the subject, but also address the PFC as an area 
inherently dedicated for the planning and execution of motor behaviours as 
emphasized by Fuster (1997). From a practical perspective, the consequences of 
risky decisions and motor actions performed in a risky ball game are clearly and 
immediately conveyed to the participants, whereby the rewards and penalties 
following execution of a motor response appear sufficiently realistic and alert to 
create a sense of riskiness. Based on multiple previous studies (Knoch, Pascual-
Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a; Gable, Neal, & Threadgill, 2018), we 
decided to modulate the right DLPFC with a low-frequency TMS protocol, 
aiming to validate the critical role of the right DLPFC in guiding non-veridical 
decision-making in risky situations, where the subject has liberty to select a 
risk-taking or risk averse, loss avoiding strategy. 
The chosen experimental task Game of Skill “Minimum-TB” (Otsa, Paaver, 
Harro, & Bachmann, 2016)–a ballgame combining fine motor action with an 
element of risk–encourages the player to obtain a high score by balancing wins 
and losses. To achieve a high score, the player needs to throw a tennis ball as 
close to the ceiling as possible, but has to avoid touching the ceiling by the ball 
in order to avoid penalties (see Figure 3). The player is free to decide on how 
much risk to take as there are no recommended strategies or “correct” choices 
for risk taking or loss aversion. Importantly, the experimental conditions also 
involved a TMS and Sham condition to test for the influence of right DLPFC 
functionality modulation on game performance. The game was played at two 
levels of risk: low and high. This experimental design was necessary in order to 
examine the impact of perceived riskiness on choice of strategy, level of game 
performance, and for relating the TMS effects to the level of risk. 
The results of Study II revealed that rTMS stimulation of the right DLPFC 
changed subjects’ risk-related behaviour on the non-veridical task involving 
execution of motor responses on which successful task performance depended. 
After TMS, the subjects became significantly more focused on immediate gains 
and less sensitive towards potential losses, leading to an overall immediately 
counterproductive strategy: the frequency of ceiling hits increased. Right 
DLPFC disruption–known to decrease inhibitory control–caused subjects to 
choose and execute riskier actions leading to unsuccessful immediate beha-
vioural outcomes. To conclude, Study II suggests that the right DLPFC plays a 
role in execution and monitoring of risk-related behaviours in non-veridical 
tasks with a motor response.  
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Figure 3. Control panel view and experimental setup of the Game of Skill: Minimum-
TB (for a detailed specification, see Otsa, Paaver, Harro, & Bachmann, 2016). The 
participant is instructed to throw a tennis ball as close to the ceiling as possible, but has 
to avoid touching the ceiling by the ball in order to prevent loss of game points. The 
player is free to decide on how much risk to take. The game is played at two levels of 
risk: low (a ceiling hit will result in loss of some of the points) and high (a ceiling hit 
will reset the score in game to zero). (Photo by J. Tulviste) 
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4. ROLE OF BDNF IN NON-VERIDICAL DECISION-
MAKING AND IN RESPONDING TO TMS 
Findings from previous studies included in the thesis suggested that prefrontal 
rTMS targeting the left DLPFC could selectively influence non-veridical, but 
not veridical decision-making (Study I) and that right DLPFC stimulation can 
influence the subject's risk seeking preferences and risk strategy selection in 
strategic goal-directed tasks involving a strong non-veridical component (Study 
II). To further explore the effects of neuromodulation on non-veridical decision-
making, the role of executive functions associated neurotransmitters and neuro-
modulators could be considered. People demonstrate considerable inter-indi-
vidual variation in decision-making strategies, likely being influenced by traits 
predisposing them to certain types of decisions. At the same time, heritable 
individual differences likely to determining the effects of TMS on non-veridical 
decision-making have not been studied. If TMS effects depend on individual 
endophenotypes, the design of treatment procedures must be adapted to account 
for this individual variability. Likewise, the majority of brain functions are 
expressed under influences of genetic factors and some specific instances of 
common genetic variability have been shown to significantly impact brain 
functioning, including the functions corresponding to decision-making (e.g., 
Bowirrat et al., 2012; Carpenter, Garcie, & Lum, 2011; Parasuraman & Jiang, 
2012). Among the variety of genes expressed within prefrontal brain neuro-
biology, the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) gene can be outlined as 
the one closely related to executive functions (e.g., Alfimova, Korovaitseva, 
Lezheiko, & Golimbet, 2012; Sun, 2018).  
A functional polymorphism rs6265 resulting in the amino acid substitution 
of valine (Val) with methionine (Met) in the proBDNF protein at codon 66 
(Val66Met) alters activity-dependent secretion of BDNF in the prefrontal 
cortex, affecting memory and executive functions (Egan et al., 2003; Bath & 
Lee, 2006). Compared to BDNF Met-carriers, Val homozygotes have been 
shown to respond differently to brief rTMS treatment of depression sympto-
matology (Bocchio-Chiavetto et al., 2008). Therefore, for the present study, the 
BDNF Val66Met genotype was selected to attempt to link common genetic 
variability, PFC, and the TMS intervention. 
 
 
4.1. Genetic factors in non-veridical cognition and  
TMS-effects 
Prior studies have established that in healthy subjects, the BDNF Val66Met 
genotype relates to changes in episodic memory performance (Egan et al., 
2003), possibly mediated by reduced size of the hippocampus (Miyajima et al., 
2008). In certain veridical types of visual discrimination tasks, common genetic 
variants of BDNF Val66Met interact with the level of performance (e.g., 
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Maksimov, Vaht, Harro, & Bachmann, 2013). Performance on the IGT veridical 
decision-making tasks was shown to be influenced by BDNF genetic variants 
(Da Rocha, Malloy‐Diniz, Lage, & Correa, 2011). However, to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no studies available that have specifically addressed the 
relationship between BDNF polymorphisms and non-veridical decision-making 
performance in healthy subjects. Similarly, no studies on TMS effects according 
to BDNF Val66Met genotype relating to non-veridical decision-making could 
be found in peer-reviewed published sources. Prior research using the CBT task 
has indicated that there are sex and handedness (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 
1994a) as well as age (Aihara, Aoyagi, Goldberg, & Nakazawa, 2003) related 
differences within healthy subjects, but there are no prior studies on genetic 
factors determining non-veridical cognition. Studies exploring links between 
personality and the BDNF Val66Met genotype have indicated that Met-carriers 
have a lower level of conscientiousness (Hiio et al., 2011). As one of the basic 
traits, conscientiousness can be related to various types of propensities in 
decision-making, and links between personality traits and genetic factors en-
courages research on potential genetic determinants of decision-making 
behaviour. 
 
 
4.2. Study III: BDNF polymorphism in non-veridical 
decision-making and differential effects of rTMS 
Studies I and II focused exploring the stimulation effects of TMS on non-
veridical decision-making without accounting for genetic factors and underlying 
neurobiological endophenotypes known to be associated to executive functions 
and activation of the frontal lobes. As noted earlier, to evaluate factors in-
fluencing non-veridical decision-making and its susceptibility to non-invasive 
neuromodulation, the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) was a likely 
candidate for follow-up research. A functional polymorphism in the BDNF gene 
that results in the substitution of valine (Val) to methionine (Met) in codon 66, 
is associated with structural and functional changes in the DLPFC and known to 
affect veridical decision-making (e.g., Da Rocha, Malloy‐Diniz, Lage, & Cor-
rea, 2011; Egan et al., 2003; Gasic et al., 2009). Studies have indicated that in 
Met-allele carriers, DLPFC volume is decreased (Pezawas et al., 2004). Met-
carriers also display selective impairment on certain delayed response memory 
tasks, while failing to disengage the hippocampus and recruit the DLPFC as 
typically observed in Val homozygotes (Egan et al., 2003). However, the role of 
BDNF Val66Met genotype in non-veridical decision-making in healthy indivi-
duals has not been specifically studied. Thus, we hypothesized that the BDNF 
genotype may relate to non-veridical cognition by determining the effects of 
TMS stimulation when comparing Met-allele carriers to Val homozygotes. The 
study employed the CBT task (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994a) which had 
been used previously (Study I) to evaluate non-veridical decision-making before 
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and after applying rTMS stimulation. Additionally, we gathered genetic data 
from participants to determine their BDNF Val66Met genotype. 
The results of Study III revealed a significant TMS and genotype interaction: 
the Met-allele carriers baseline scores were significantly lower compared to 
Val-homozygotes, indicating a more context-independent, personal preference 
driven selection behaviour as measured by the CBT task. Furthermore, 
following TMS stimulation, Met-carriers became even more driven by internal 
preferences, not allowing external stimuli to substantially affect their choices, 
whereas Val homozygotes remained more context-dependent, relying on 
externally presented cues. Study III revealed that there are genetic differences in 
non-veridical behaviour related to the BDNF gene, and that rTMS stimulation 
can enhance preexisting genetically determined biases in choice preference. 
Consequently, depending on the specific genetic variant a person has, it is 
conceivable to adjust TMS protocols to account for genetic factors affecting the 
response to treatments. More generally, when designing and applying (r)TMS 
interventions for experimental or clinical purposes, it is relevant to incorporate 
genotyping data to account for the variance of the genes knowingly involved in 
decision-making behaviour. 
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5. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this work was to explore the neurobiological mechanisms of non-
veridical decision-making by examining how TMS affects non-veridical 
behaviour. Neural activity at the DLPFC was modulated using both, low- and 
high frequency rTMS stimulation protocols, to deliver either inhibitory or 
excitatory TMS-induced currents to the target region of the brain. As decision-
making is also regulated by several neurotransmitters and neurobiological 
endophenotypes associated with prefrontal functions, the impact of the BDNF 
Val66Met genotype on non-veridical performance was evaluated. 
To summarise the empirical findings obtained within the scope of the thesis, 
the following statements can be made: 
 
1. Non-veridical behaviour can be modulated by applying rTMS to the 
DLPFC, but the size and nature of the effect depends on the characte-
ristics of the task, the lateralization of task-related brain mechanisms 
and stimulation site (Studies I-III), as well as the neurobiological endo-
phenotypes involved (Study III).  
2. Selective modulation of non-veridical behaviour without affecting 
performance on a veridical visuo-spatial task was also achieved by 
targeting the left DLPFC (Study I). 
3. TMS effects do not necessarily mimic brain lesions, even if the target of 
TMS is located in the same cortical region. Instead of resembling 
prefrontal lesions, some of the behavioural effects following TMS 
stimulation of the DLPFC were more similar to posterior lesions (Study 
I). The mismatch between TMS-induced virtual lesions and real lesions 
may be due to the spread of local TMS effects to interconnected remote 
regions in the brain. In case of a risky decision-making task with a 
motor response (Study II), the effects of inhibitory right DLPFC 
stimulation closely resembled right DLPFC lesions, both leading to loss 
of inhibitory control and increase in risk taking. 
4. In non-veridical cognition, neurobiological endophenotypes may 
determine the baseline as well as the neuromodulation effects of a 
behavioural measure. In Study III, the BDNF Val66Met genotype was 
associated with a bias in non-veridical preferences: Val/Val and 
Val/Met subjects had a significantly different choice preferences on a 
non-veridical task and they responded differently to rTMS stimulation 
of the right DLPFC, further enhancing their preexisting biases. Without 
controlling for genotype differences, the pre-existing non-veridical 
biases would not have been detected and the differential TMS effects 
would have remained hidden. 
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More generally, in regard to the two main application areas of brain stimula- 
tion – experimental and clinical – this thesis emphasizes several factors that 
determine the cortical and behavioural effects of TMS.  
In a research setting, TMS protocols do not necessarily have the same effect 
across subjects. Several factors are known to influence the effect of TMS on an 
individual subject including age, handedness, sex, the initial neural activation 
state (Eldaief, Press, & Pascual-Leone, 2013; Rossini, Rossini, & Ferreri, 2010; 
Silvanto, Bona, Marelli, & Cattaneo, 2018; Valero-Cabré, Amengual, Stengel, 
Pascual-Leone, & Coubard, 2017; Wassermann, Epstein, Ziemann, Welsh, 
Paus, & Lisanby, 2008). TMS can be adjusted to accommodate the individual 
characteristics of the subject by determining the individual motor threshold 
(MT) for each participant prior to stimulation. Based on the MT, the intensity of 
the magnetic field is regulated. However, this “personalization” of stimulation 
treatments does not fully cover the variation exhibited in neurobiological and 
behavioural responses to TMS. The current thesis, namely Study III, illustrates 
the significant genetic component in how an individual responds to TMS 
treatment just by looking at a single determinant (BDNF Val66Met genotype). 
Most likely, a plethora of genetic determinants exist that–individually or in 
interaction–affect TMS responses, calling for researchers and clinicians to 
account for genetic determinants when using neuromodulation techniques. As 
our knowledge of relevant genetic factors expands, the current research 
protocols and subject preparation checklists need to be revised in order to 
account for new factors to be considered when applying TMS to a subject. 
In clinical practice, the guidelines for TMS devices and protocols are cleared 
by regulatory authorities such as the Federal Drug Administration and NICE to 
enforce the use of evidence-based protocols for treatment of specific clinical 
conditions (e.g., major depressive disorder). Subjects are screened according to 
inclusion-exclusion criteria and the response to treatment is monitored through-
out the course of treatment sessions. Therapeutic interventions of major depres-
sion are based on left-right DLPFC imbalance model, according to which 
clinical depression is characterized by hypoactivity of the left and hyperactivity 
of the right DLPFC. The antidepressant efficacy of high-frequency rTMS over 
the left DLPFC has been established and recognized (e.g., Schutter, 2009; 
Perera et al., 2016). Research findings also suggests that depressed patients 
benefit from low-frequency stimulation of the right DLPFC (Grimm et al., 
2008; Bermpohl et al., 2006). The results of the current thesis, whereby low-
frequency stimulation of the right DLPFC triggered elevated risk-taking in 
healthy subjects (Study II), suggest that right DLPFC excitability is characte-
rised by a continuum: relative to left, the right DLPFC is hyperactive in major 
depression, but hypoactive in healthy subjects following low-frequency TMS. 
By discriminating veridical vs. non-veridical cognition, the diagnosis and 
subsequent treatment of clinical conditions with established stimulation 
protocols–such as major depressive disorder–may be enhanced to improve the 
precision of diagnosis as well as to afford a more efficient technique for 
predicting and monitoring the response of the patient to TMS treatment. 
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Reliable biomarkers for predicting treatment outcome for patients on an 
individual level would be of great clinical utility, but are hard to identify 
(Silverstein et al., 2015). Currently, the response of an individual patient to 
rTMS treatment of major depression is hard to predict. A reliable and more 
accurate option to evaluate the early response of a patient to TMS therapy by 
focusing exclusively on non-veridical short-term effects may provide relevant 
feedback on the responsiveness or unresponsiveness of the patient. Again, as 
genetic factors contribute to determining the left-right DLPFC balance and 
response to TMS interventions (Study III), this knowledge is potentially 
relevant to be included in clinical TMS guidelines in the future as knowledge of 
genetic factors and accessibility to genotyping facilities expands. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Otsustusprotsesside mõjutamine transkraniaalse 
magnetstimulatsiooniga 
Inimese käitumist kontrollivate otsustusprotsesside mõistmiseks on oluline 
tuvastada nii erinevat tüüpi otsuste neurobioloogilised mehhanismid kui ka välja 
selgitada nende otsustusprotsesside seosed frontaalsagara poolt juhitavate 
eksekutiivsete funktsioonidega. Eksekutiivsed ehk täidesaatvad funktsioonid on 
kontrollitud käitumise alustalaks ning hõlmavad nii käitumise planeerimist, 
alternatiivsete käitumisstrateegiate kaalumist kui ka impulsiivse käitumise 
pidurdamist (Welsh jt, 1991). Otsustusprotsesse võib vaadelda eksekutiivsete 
funktsioonide osana, mille eesmärgiks on säilitada sihipäraste tegevuste toimu-
mise ajal pidev eesmärgi saavutamisele suunatud kontroll käitumise üle (Fel-
lows, 2013). 
Kuigi otsustusprotsesside neuropsühholoogilisel uurimisel on siiani kasu-
tatud peamiselt õige/vale vastusega nn. veridikaalseid ülesandeid, siis inimese 
igapäevaelus on olulisel kohal ka subjektiivsed, “suhteliselt õiged” otsused. 
Subjektiivsete otsuste korral puudub sageli üheselt mõistetav vastus, mille on 
dikteerinud testikoostaja või faktid; selliste otsuste puhul sõltub vastus vastaja 
enda subjektiivsetest eelistustest, maitsest või olukorrast (Goldberg jt, 1994; 
2012). Siiski on enamik neuropsühholoogilisi teste, sh Wisconsini kaarditest 
(Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Grant ja Berg, 1948), oma põhimõttelt veridi-
kaalsed (Podell jt, 2012). Isegi riski ja teadmatuse komponenti hõlmavad 
neuropsühholoogilised ülesanded, näiteks Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara jt, 
1994), on oma olemuselt mingis osas veridikaalsed, sest eeldavad inimeselt 
kindlate, esialgu varjatud mängureeglite äratundmist ning katse-eksituse mee-
todil kasulikumate valikute tegemist (Brand jt, 2006). Samas on inimene vaba 
(st veridikaalset tüüpi otsuste reeglitest piiramata) valima riskeerimismäära oma 
parema äranägemise järgi. Seega on valik riskida suuremal või vähemal määral 
mitte-veridikaalne. 
Käesolev väitekiri keskendub mitte-veridikaalsete otsustusprotsesside uuri-
misele, kasutades selleks transkraniaalse magnetstimulatsiooni (TMS) meetodit. 
Magnetimpulssidega otsustusprotsessidega seotud dorsolateraalse prefrontaal-
korteksi (DLPFK) piirkondi mõjutades on võimalik tuvastada mitte-veridikaal-
sete otsuste neurobioloogilisi korrelaate ning uurida veridikaalseid ja mitte-
veridikaalseid otsuseid vastandava teoreetilise mudeli paikapidavust. Erinevalt 
veridikaalsetest otsustest, mille puhul on teada üldtunnustatud ning objektiivne 
õige või vale vastus (nt. Kumb objekt on suurem? või Kumba eset esineb min-
gis hulgas rohkem?), puudub mitte-veridikaalse otsuse puhul ühene, objektiivne 
vastus, mille äraarvamist vastajalt oodatakse. Mitte-veridikaalse otsuse puhul on 
vastus subjektiivne, sõltudes vastaja eelistustest, maitsest või tahtest, vastamisel 
lähtutakse printsiibist “mis mulle rohkem meeldib või mis on mulle parim?”. 
Täpsemalt keskendub töö otsustusprotsessidega seotud ajupiirkondade mõju-
tamisele, jälgides magnetstimulatsiooni tagajärjel tekkivaid käitumuslikke 
43 
muutusi. Selleks, et hinnata, kas veridikaalseid ja mitte-veridikaalseid otsustus-
protsesse on võimalik teineteisest sõltumatult manipuleerida, stimuleeriti aju-
koore frontaalsagara parem- ja vasakpoolset DLPFK piirkonda nii madal- kui 
kõrgsagedusliku magnetstimulatsiooniga (Uurimus I). Uurimistulemused näita-
sid, et kummagi ajupoolkera stimuleerimine nii madalatel kui kõrgetel sage-
dustel kutsus esile muutusi mitte-veridikaalses nn. Kognitiivse Kallutatuse 
Ülesandes (KKÜ, ingl. k. Cognitive Bias Task, Goldberg jt, 1994b). Seejuures 
tõi ainult parema DLPFK madalsageduslik (pidurdav) stimuleerimine esile 
muutusi ka veridikaalses soorituses.  
Selleks, et parempoolse DLPFK piirkonna rolli otsustusprotsessides pare-
mini mõista, rakendasime järgmisena riskeeriva käitumise ülesannet Game of 
Skill (Otsa jt, 2016). Ka seda hea tulemuse saavutamiseks riskeerimist eelda-
vatel pallivisetel põhinevat ülesannet võib käsitleda mitte-veridikaalsena, kuna 
katseisikul on vaba voli valida, kui suurt riski ta soovib võtta. Palli katseruumi 
laele võimalikult lähedale visates saab katseisik küll rohkem punkte, kuid suu-
reneb ka tõenäosus, et pall puudutab lage, millega kaasneb kas osade (mada-
lama riskitasemega mängurežiim) või kõigi (kõrgema riskitasemega mäng) 
eelnevalt kogutud punktide kaotamine. Uurimuse II tulemused näitasid, et kui 
normaaltingimustes käitusid katseisikud kõrgema riskitasemega mängurežiimi 
puhul ettevaatlikumalt, pigem hoidudes laepuudutuseni viivatest visetest, siis 
parempoolse DLPFK pidurdava stimuleerimise tagajärjel riskivõtmine suurenes 
ning oluliselt suurenes ka lae palliga puudutamise osakaal. Katse kinnitas 
parempoolse DLPFK rolli pidurdavas käitumises mitte-veridikaalse riskeeriva 
ülesande näitel. Kuna riskeeriva käitumise puhul on tegemist käitumise 
kontrollis oluliste pidurdusmehhanismide nõrgema panusega (ettevaatlikkuse 
vähema määraga), siis on arusaadav, miks parempoolse DLPFK kui teada-
olevalt tegevuse pidurdamises oluliselt osaleva ajupiirkonna erutuvuse kunstlik 
pärssimine päädib vähenenud ettevaatlikkusega. 
Kuna otsustusprotsesside neurobioloogiat mõjutavad ka frontaalsagara 
aktiivsusega seotud geneetilised tegurid ning nende poolt kujundatud neurobio-
loogilised endofenotüübid, siis on tõenäoline, et mitte-veridikaalseid otsustus-
protsesse ning nendes TMS poolt esilekutsutavaid muutusi mõjutavad ka 
geenid. Järgnevalt uuritigi (Uurimus III) ajus toodetavat närvikasvu faktorit 
kodeeriva geeni BDNF rolli mitte-veridikaalsetes otsustes. BDNF geenis 
esinevat polümorfismi (SNP rs6265), mille tagajärjel valiin on asendunud 
metioniiniga (Val66Met), on varem seostatud strukturaalsete ja anatoomiliste 
muutustega dorsolateraalses prefrontaalkorteksis ning mõjutustega veridikaal-
setele otsustusprotessidele (nt. Egan jt, 2003; Gasic jt, 2009). Met-alleeli 
kandjatel on täheldatud vähenenud DLPFK mahtu (Pezawas jt, 2004) ning 
madalamat võimekust teatud tüüpi töömälu ülesannete soorituses, mida 
ilmestavad muutused hippokampuse ja DLPFK aktivatsioonimustrites (Egan jt, 
2003). Tulemused näitasid Val66Met olulist mõju mitte-veridikaalsele otsus-
tamisele: Met-alleeli kandjad järgisid KKÜ-ülesandes selgeid väljakujunenud 
eelistusi ja valikukriteeriume, samas kui Val homosügoodid lähtusid valikutes 
rohkem välise stiimuli mõjutustest, ilmutades suuremat sõltuvust kontekstist. 
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Täiendavalt ilmnes ka oluline genotüübi ja TMS mõju interaktsioon: Met-alleeli 
kandjatel süvenes internaalsetel eelistustel põhinev valikute tegemine veelgi, 
samas kui Val homosügootide käitumine TMS mõjutuste tagajärjel oluliselt ei 
muutunud. Selles tulemuses peitub võimalus TMS-põhiste teraapiameetodite 
väljaarendamiseks neuroloogiliste või psühhiaatriliste diagnooside korral, mille 
oluliseks sümptomiks on käitumise liigne pidurdatus vastusena keskkonna-
tegurite mõjule. 
Tervikuna näitavad väitekirja uuringud, et mitte-veridikaalseid otsustus-
protsesse on võimalik TMS-i abil selektiivselt mõjutada, kusjuures vasakpoolne 
DLPFK näib olevat rohkem spetsialiseerunud mitte-veridikaalsetele kognitiiv-
setele otsustele kui parempoolne (Uurimus I). Väitekirjas leidis täiendavat 
kinnitust parempoolse DLPFK oluline roll impulsiivses ja riskantses käitumises: 
parempoolse DLPFK väsitamine madalsagedusliku magnetstimulatsiooniga 
toob kaasa pidurduse vähenemise ning oluliselt riskeerivama käitumisstrateegia 
(Uurimus II). Uuring III kinnitas BDNF geeni polümorfismi rs6265 olulist mõju 
nii mitte-veridikaalsetele otsustusprotsessidele kui ka sellele, kuidas 
prefrontaalsete piirkondade mõjutamine TMS-iga mitte-veridikaalset käitumist 
muudab. Autorile teadaolevalt ei ole mitte-veridikaalsete otsustusprotsesside 
TMS-mõjutusi ning seoseid BDNF geeniga varem uuritud. Tulemused ilmes-
tavad ühtlasi ka seda, et TMS rakendamine avaldab korteksi piirkondadele nii 
lokaalset kui distaalset (TMS lookusest eemal avalduvat) mõju ning et TMS-i 
meetodil esile kutsutud “virtuaalne ajukahjustus” ei pruugi käitumuslikult 
matkida sama ajupiirkonna fokaalset ajukahjustust. Väitekiri illustreerib 
geneetiliste tegurite olulisust mitte-veridikaalsete otsustusprotsessides ning 
näitab, et geneetiliste teguritega tuleb arvestada, kui eksperimentaalses või 
kliinilises töös rakendatakse TMS meetodit. 
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